How Borda voting rule can respect Arrow IIA and avoid Cloning manipulation by DOMBOU T., Dany R.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
How Borda voting rule can respect
Arrow IIA and avoid Cloning
manipulation
Dany R. DOMBOU T.
University of Dschang
July 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/80608/
MPRA Paper No. 80608, posted 9 August 2017 23:47 UTC
 How Borda voting rule can respect Arrow IIA and avoid Cloning 
manipulation 
 
 
  
28 juillet 2017 
 
 
Dany R. Dombou T. 
University of Dschang, Cameroon - Department of Economic 
Policy Analysis 
P.O. Box: 110 Dschang, Cameroon 
dany.dombou@hotmail.com  
Tel. +237 676267809 
 
How Borda voting rule can respect Arrow IIA and avoid Cloning manipulation 
 
1 
 
How Borda voting rule can respect Arrow IIA and avoid Cloning 
manipulation 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper proposes a new formulation of the Borda rule in order to deal with the 
problem of cloning manipulation. This new Borda voting specification will be named: Dynamic 
Borda Voting (DBV) and it satisfies Arrow's IIA condition. The calculations, propositions with 
proof and explanations are made to show the effectiveness of this method. From DBV, the paper 
presents a method to measure and quantify the magnitude of the shock due to change in 
irrelevant alternatives over a scale moving from 0 to 100. 
Keywords: Voting rules; Arrow IIA; Cloning manipulation; 
JEL Classification: D8;  D7; C6. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Is the individual rational making his choices? If so, is that the whole society is rational? 
In an election by ballot, the plurality of votes always indicates the wishes of the voters, that is 
to say that the candidate who obtains this plurality is necessarily the one that the voters prefer 
to his opponents (Borda, 1781). Borda (1781) shows that this opinion, is true in the situation 
where the vote is made between only two subjects, but it may be misleading in all the other 
situations. Since the eighteenth century, two voting methods claim to be able to provide 
solutions to this problem of aggregation of individual choices: the main works are from Borda 
(1781) and Condorcet (1785).  
Unfortunately, these works are not faultless and face many criticisms. This paper 
focuses on voting Borda. One of the main criticisms of the Borda rule is that it is highly 
vulnerable to strategic voting. Voting strategically for/against a candidate means giving a higher 
or lower Borda score than the voter’s preference ordering would imply (Lehtinen, 2007). 
According to Black (1958), defending the susceptibility of his rule to strategic manipulation, 
Borda claimed, “My scheme is intended only for honest men”. About that, In Borda count a 
defeated candidate can manipulate the election result in his favour in sincere way by introducing 
a candidate which is a clone of him and voters ranked this clone candidate immediately below 
him. In this situation Borda rule is strictly follows but manipulation is possible (Islam, Mohajan, 
& Moolio, 2012).  
Borda rule faces a major constraint. This is Arrow's impossibility theorem. Arrow 
(1963) states that when voters have three or more distinct alternatives, no ranked voting 
electoral system can convert the ranked preferences of individuals into a community-wide 
ranking while also satisfying a specified set of criteria: Universal Domain (UD), Non-
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Dictatorship (ND), Strict Pareto (SP) and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) (Arrow, 
1963). In fact, although Borda's rule satisfies the first 3 conditions, it does not respect IIA one. 
This paper proposes a new formulation of the Borda rule in order to deal with the 
problem of cloning manipulation. This new Borda voting specification will be named: Dynamic 
Borda Voting (DBV) and it satisfies Arrow's IIA condition. From DBV, the paper presents a 
method to measure and quantify the magnitude of the shock due to change in irrelevant 
alternatives over a scale moving from 0 to 100. 
The DBV opens the way to practical applications. The paper will present as an example, 
its application on the risk aversion behaviour of investors on the stock market due to exogenous 
shocks. Modelling this will focus on changes in individual stock portfolio selections and their 
influence on the overall market situation. 
1 RELATED LITERATURE 
 
One of the best known and most important results of social choice theory is the theorem 
of Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) which states that the only rules of ‘’non-
manipulable’’ collective choice by agents are dictatorial rules (Béhue, Favardin, & Lepelley, 
2009). In other words, any rule of collective choice that is somewhat democratic comes up 
against the following difficulty: there are situations in which an agent (or a coalition of agents) 
is induced to express a non-sincere preference in order to obtain a result Which he prefers to 
the one he would get with a sincere strategy (Béhue, Favardin, & Lepelley, 2009). 
According to Satterthwaite (1975) almost every participant in the formal deliberations 
of a commission realizes that situations may occur where he can manipulate the outcome of the 
commission’s vote by misrepresenting his preferences. For example, a voter in choosing among 
a Democrat, a Republican, and a minor party candidate may decide to follow the “sophisticated 
strategy” of voting for his second choice, the Democrat, instead of his “sincere strategy” of 
voting for his first choice, the minor party candidate, because he thinks that a vote for the minor 
party candidate would be a wasted vote on a 
hopeless cause. Satterthwaite (1975) investigates if a committee can eliminate use of 
sophisticated strategies among its members by constructing a voting procedure that is “strategy-
proof” in the sense that under it, no committee member will ever have an incentive to use a 
sophisticated strategy. He found that every strategy-proof voting procedure is dictatorial 
(Satterthwaite, 1975).  
Voting paradoxes are numerous. Lepelley, Moyouwou & Smaoui (2017) study scoring 
elimination rules (SER). SER gives points to candidates according to their rank in voters’ 
preference orders and eliminates those with the lowest number of points, constitute an important 
class of voting rules. This class of rules, that includes some famous voting methods such as 
Plurality Runoff or Coombs Rule, suffers from a severe pathology known as monotonicity 
paradox or monotonicity failure, that is, getting more points from voters can make a candidate 
a loser and getting fewer points can make a candidate a winner (Lepelley, Moyouwou, & 
Smaoui, 2017). Focusing on the profiles that create the strict and the strong Borda paradoxes 
Diss & Tlidi (2016) provide an organized knowledge of the conditions for a profile to show or 
to never show Borda’s paradox. The framework they use allows them to determine the 
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minimum number of voters needed for a profile to show either the strong or the strict Borda 
paradoxes when the differences between candidates and the weighted scoring rule are already 
determined. It also allows them to give the differences between candidates in the pairwise 
election outcomes required for a profile to never exhibit one of the two paradoxes for a given 
weighted scoring rule and a fixed number of voters. Finally, they are able to describe what range 
of weighted scoring rules could possibly accompany a given number of voters and specified 
differences between candidates in the pairwise election outcomes in order for a profile to never 
exhibit one of the two paradoxes. 
Saari & McIntee (2013) work on pairwise and positional election outcomes. According 
to them, while it has been known since the eighteenth century that the Borda and Condorcet 
winners need not agree, it had not been known, for instance, in which settings the Condorcet 
and plurality winners can disagree, or must agree. These relationships are based on an easily 
used method that connects pairwise tallies with admissible positional outcomes (Saari & 
McIntee, 2013).  
Another important issue of voting is Arrow’s Impossibility paradox. By the way, Barbie, 
Puppe & Tasnádi (2006) characterize the preference domains on which the Borda count satisfies 
Arrow’s “Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)” condition. According to them, these 
domains are obtained by fixing one preference ordering and including all its cyclic permutations 
(Condorcet cycles). Therefore, the Borda count is ‘’non-manipulable’’ on a broader class of 
domains when combined with appropriately chosen tie-breaking rules (Barbie, Puppe, & 
Tasnádi, 2006). On the other hand, they also prove that the rich domains on which the Borda 
count is ‘’non-manipulable’’ for all possible tie-breaking rules are again the cyclic permutation 
domains. Ever since their work, the two most important results of social choice theory, the 
impossibility theorems of Arrow and Gibbard-Satterthwaite (see Barbie, Puppe, & Tasnádi, 
2006), have led to a steady search for possibility results on restricted domains.  
The common method is to fix an appropriate set of admissible preferences, and to 
determine which social welfare functions satisfy Arrow’s conditions. This is done considering 
that social choice functions are ‘’non-manipulable’’, on that preference domain. Another view 
on the question is presented by Dasgupta and Maskin (2003) based on Maskin (1995) work. 
They consider specific preference aggregation rules such as Borda count, and ask on what 
domains these rules satisfy desirable conditions in the spirit of Arrow’s conditions.  
 
2 DYNAMIC BORDA VOTING (DBV) AND IIA ARROW’S CONDITION 
 
2.1 SIMPLE BORDA VOTING AND ARROW’S IIA PRESENTATION 
 
2.1.1 Theoretical presentation 
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Let’s adopt Borda Voting presentation in (Islam, Mohajan, & Moolio, 2012). Let M = 
{1, 2, … m} be the set of individual voters, and let N = {x, y, …, z} be the finite set of 
alternatives where Card(M) = m and Card(N) = n.  
Each voter has to rank the candidates in his preference order and then, we proceed to 
the count of the number of times each candidate is ranked first. At the end, the candidate who 
receives a relative majority is elected. 
If x is strictly preferred to y we write xPy and so on. If x is related to y, the binary relations 
according to Arrow (1963) is as follows:  
• Reflexivity: ∀ x ∈ N; xRx . 
• Completeness: ∀ x, y ∈ N & x ≠ y ⇒ xRy or yRx . 
• Transitivity: ∀ x, y, z ∈ N if , xRy & yRz ⇒ xRz . 
• Anti-symmetry: ∀ x, y ∈ N if , xRy & yRx ⇒ x = y . 
• Asymmetry: ∀ x, y ∈ N, such that xRy ⇒ ~ (yRx). 
According to Arrow (1963), the social welfare function should satisfy independence of 
irrelevant alternatives. It says that if we’re trying to figure out whether society prefers x to y, 
what people think of z shouldn’t matter.  
 
2.1.2 Arithmetical Calculations 
Let us assume that there are 4 voters and 4 alternatives x, y, z and t and the preference 
profile be as follows:  
Voter 1: 𝑥𝑃𝑦𝑃𝑧𝑃𝑡  / Voter 2: 𝑥𝑃𝑦𝑃𝑧𝑃𝑡  / 
 Voter 3: 𝑦𝑃𝑥𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑧   / 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 4: 𝑦𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑥𝑃𝑧  
 
In the social preferences matrix, we have for the 1st profile (𝑅1
𝑁):  
𝑖1
3 𝑥
𝑖2
𝑥
2 𝑦 𝑦
𝑖3
𝑦
𝑖4
𝑦
𝑥 𝑡
1 𝑧 𝑧
0 𝑡 𝑡
𝑡 𝑥
𝑧 𝑧
 
 
With 𝑖𝑖 representing voter ii ∈ [1,4]. Card(N) = 4 and n-1 = 3.  
Let’s note Borda score for x: 𝐵𝑥 Therefore, Borda count for the different alternatives will be as 
follows: 
❖ For x: 𝐵𝑥 = 3×2 + 2×1 + 1×1 +  0×0 = 9  
❖ For y: 𝐵𝑦 = 3×2 + 2×2 + 1×0 +  0×0 = 10  
❖ For z: 𝐵𝑧 = 3×0 + 2×0 + 1×2 +  0×2 = 2  
❖ For t: 𝐵𝑡 = 3×0 + 2×1 + 1×1 +  0×2 = 3  
Here y gets the highest marks that is 𝐵𝑦 = 10, so y wins.  
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The social preference order is (𝑆1): 𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑧⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ . 
 
2.1.3 The problem 
 
According to Arrow (1963), there is no social welfare rule that satisfies the all 4 
impossibility theorem conditions. Borda rule respect the 3 first Arrow’s conditions, but doesn’t 
satisfies the last one that is IIA.  
Proof:  
Let’s consider the same example, but let’s assume in respect to IIA, that some voters 
(𝑖1, 𝑖2, 𝑖4)  change their preferences (Satterthwaite, 1975), but keep the same first choice. 
Voter 1: 𝑥𝑃𝑧𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑦  / Voter 2: 𝑥𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑧𝑃𝑦  / Voter 3: 𝑦𝑃𝑥𝑃𝑡𝑃𝑧   / 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑟 4: 𝑦𝑃𝑥𝑃𝑧𝑃𝑡 
The 2nd profile matrix of social preference (𝑅2
𝑁) will be as follow:        
𝑖1
3 𝑥
𝑖2
𝑥
2 𝑧 𝑡
𝑖3
𝑦
𝑖4
𝑦
𝑥 𝑥
1 𝑡 𝑧
0 𝑦 𝑦
𝑡 𝑧
𝑧 𝑡
 
Borda count for the different alternatives will be as follows: 
❖ For x: ?̇?𝑥 = 3×2 + 2×2 + 1×0 +  0×0 = 10  
❖ For y: ?̇?𝑦 = 3×2 + 2×0 + 1×0 +  0×2 = 6  
❖ For z: ?̇?𝑧 = 3×0 + 2×1 + 1×2 +  0×1 = 4  
❖ For t: ?̇?𝑡 = 3×0 + 2×1 + 1×2 +  0×1 = 4  
Here x gets the highest marks that is ?̇?𝑥 = 10, so x wins instead of y.  
The social preference order(𝑆2) in (𝑅2
𝑁) is: 𝑥, 𝑦, (𝑡, 𝑧⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗) ≠ 𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑧⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ in (𝑅1
𝑁) 
Conclusion: Borda voting does not respect IIA.  
 
2.2 DYNAMIC BORDA VOTING (DBV): A SOLUTION? 
 
Now let’s bring some adjustments to the Borda rule. The DBV consist on computing (in 
the 1st profile 𝑅𝑘
𝑁) weight linked to Borda winner through dynamic steps, and used them to 
determine (in the 2nd profile 𝑅𝑙
𝑁) the social preferences after changes in individual preferences.  
Statement: 
 ∀ 𝒙,…𝒚, 𝒛 ∈ 𝑵, 𝒂𝒏𝒅 ∀ (𝑺𝒌) ≠ (𝑺𝒍),   
∃  ?̇?𝑵𝝎 = 𝒇(𝑩𝒙𝝎 , … , 𝑩𝒚𝝎 , 𝑩𝒛𝝎) 𝒔𝒖𝒄𝒉 𝒂𝒔 (𝑺
𝒌) = (𝑺𝒍)  
The objective is to find from the 𝐵𝑥𝜔 the ?̇?𝑁𝜔 that, respect: (𝑆
𝑘) = (𝑆𝑙); 
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𝐵𝑥𝜔 follows a geometrical progression: 𝑩𝒙𝒋 = 𝑩𝒙𝟎×(𝒏 − 𝟏)
𝒋𝒙−𝟏;  
j is the level of dynamic floor. 
So that: lim
(𝑛,𝑗)→∞
𝐵𝑥𝑗 = 𝐵𝑥0×(𝑛 − 1)
𝑗𝑥−1 = ∞;   
If Card(M) = m  𝑗 ∈ [1,𝑚] 
𝐵𝑁𝑖 are computed according to an order of entry in a floor chain. The order considered is the 
(𝑆𝑘) one.  
All the 𝐵𝑥𝜔 obtained from 𝑅𝑘
𝑁 are used to compute the ?̇?𝑁𝜔 in 𝑅𝑙
𝑁 . With 𝑘 < 𝑙. 
?̇?𝑁𝜔 = ?̇?𝑁×𝐵𝑁𝜔 
 
2.2.1 Arithmetical Calculations 
 
Let’s consider the same above example. There are 4 voters and 4 alternatives x, y, z and 
t and the preference profile be as follows:  
In 𝑅𝑘=1
𝑁 , 
𝑖1
3 𝑥
𝑖2
𝑥
2 𝑦 𝑦
𝑖3
𝑦
𝑖4
𝑦
𝑥 𝑡
1 𝑧 𝑧
0 𝑡 𝑡
𝑡 𝑥
𝑧 𝑧
 
In 𝑅𝑙=2
𝑁 ,         
𝑖1
3 𝑥
𝑖2
𝑥
2 𝑧 𝑡
𝑖3
𝑦
𝑖4
𝑦
𝑥 𝑥
1 𝑡 𝑧
0 𝑦 𝑦
𝑡 𝑧
𝑧 𝑡
 
 
Using the simple Borda Voting, we demonstrated that: The social preference order(𝑆2) in (𝑅2
𝑁) 
is: 𝑥, 𝑦, (𝑡, 𝑧⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗) ≠ 𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑧⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ in (𝑅1
𝑁)  (𝑆1) ≠ (𝑆2). 
❖ Now let’s find the 𝐵𝑁𝜔: 𝐵𝑥𝜔 , 𝐵𝑦𝜔 , 𝐵𝑧𝜔  & 𝐵𝑡𝜔 
Number of floor is Card (N) = 4. 
Order of entrance in floor1: (𝑆1): 𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑧⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ 
𝐵𝑦 = 𝐵𝑦0 = 10; 𝐵𝑥 = 𝐵𝑥0 = 9; 𝐵𝑡 = 𝐵𝑡0 = 3 & 𝐵𝑧 = 𝐵𝑧0 = 2. 
 
i. First Floor: 𝒋𝒚 = 𝟏. 
                                                     
1 In the event of a tie, choose the Condorcet winner. 
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According to (𝑆1), the individual entering in this floor is y.  
Therefor, 
• 𝐵𝑦1 = 𝐵𝑦0×(𝑛 − 1)
1−1 = 10×(4 − 1)0 = 10 
In all cases, 𝐵𝑁 = 𝐵𝑁0 = 𝐵𝑁1. 
 
ii. Second Floor: 𝑗𝑦 = 2; 𝒋𝒙 = 𝟏. 
According to (𝑆1), the individual entering in this floor is x.  
• 𝐵𝑦2 = 𝐵𝑦0×(𝑛 − 1)
2−1 = 10×(4 − 1)1 = 30 
• 𝐵𝑥1 = 𝐵𝑥0×(𝑛 − 1)
1−1 = 9×(4 − 1)0 = 9 
 
iii. Third Floor: 𝑗𝑦 = 3; 𝑗𝑥 = 2; 𝒋𝒕 = 𝟏. 
According to (𝑆1), the individual entering in this floor is t.  
• 𝐵𝑦3 = 𝐵𝑦0×(𝑛 − 1)
3−1 = 10×(4 − 1)2 = 90 
• 𝐵𝑥2 = 𝐵𝑥0×(𝑛 − 1)
2−1 = 9×(4 − 1)1 = 27 
• 𝐵𝑡1 = 𝐵𝑡0×(𝑛 − 1)
1−1 = 3×(4 − 1)0 = 3 
 
iv. Last Floor: 𝑗𝑦 = 4; 𝑗𝑥 = 3; 𝑗𝑡 = 2; 𝒋𝒛 = 𝟏. 
According to (𝑆1), the individual entering in this floor is z.  
• 𝐵𝑦4 = 𝐵𝑦0×(𝑛 − 1)
4−1 = 10×(4 − 1)3 = 270 
• 𝐵𝑥3 = 𝐵𝑥0×(𝑛 − 1)
3−1 = 9×(4 − 1)2 = 81 
• 𝐵𝑡2 = 𝐵𝑡0×(𝑛 − 1)
2−1 = 3×(4 − 1)1 = 9 
• 𝐵𝑧1 = 𝐵𝑧0×(𝑛 − 1)
1−1 = 2×(4 − 1)0 = 2 
As we are in the last floor, the 𝐵𝑁𝜔are:  𝐵𝑥𝜔 = 81,  𝐵𝑦𝜔 = 270,   𝐵𝑧𝜔 = 2  &   𝐵𝑡𝜔 = 9. 
 
❖ Now let’s derived the ?̇?𝑁𝜔: ?̇?𝑥𝜔 , ?̇?𝑦𝜔 , ?̇?𝑧𝜔  & ?̇?𝑡𝜔 
They are as:  ?̇?𝑁𝜔 = ?̇?𝑁×𝐵𝑁𝜔 
We already have the ?̇?𝑁. They are Borda points of different alternatives in 𝑅2
𝑁 . 
Previously, we have demonstrated that in 𝑅2
𝑁, the Borda winner is not the same as in 𝑅1
𝑁due to 
change in irrelevant alternatives. That led to (𝑆1) ≠ (𝑆2). 
This is what happen in the matrix 
for 𝑗𝑦 = 2; 𝒋𝒙 = 𝟏 
𝑖1
3 𝑥
𝑖2
𝑥
2 3𝑦 3𝑦
𝑖3
3𝑦
𝑖4
3𝑦
𝑥 𝑡
1 𝑧 𝑧
0 𝑡 𝑡
𝑡 𝑥
𝑧 𝑧
 
This is what happen in the matrix 
for 𝑗𝑦 = 3; 𝑗𝑥 = 2; 𝒋𝒕 = 𝟏 
𝑖1
3 3𝑥
𝑖2
3𝑥
2 9𝑦 9𝑦
𝑖3
9𝑦
𝑖4
9𝑦
3𝑥 𝑡
1 𝑧 𝑧
0 𝑡 𝑡
𝑡 3𝑥
𝑧 𝑧
 
This is what happen in the matrix 
for 𝑗𝑦 = 4; 𝑗𝑥 = 3; 𝑗𝑡 = 2; 𝒋𝒛 = 𝟏. 
𝑖1
3 9𝑥
𝑖2
9𝑥
2 27𝑦 27𝑦
𝑖3
27𝑦
𝑖4
27𝑦
9𝑥 3𝑡
1 𝑧 𝑧
0 3𝑡 3𝑡
3𝑡 3𝑥
𝑧 𝑧
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Now, let’s consider the same changes in the irrelevant alternatives. 
?̇?𝑥 = 10, ?̇?𝑦 = 6, ?̇?𝑧 = 4, &  ?̇?𝑡 = 4. 
Let’s consider our weights: 
   
 ?̇?𝑥𝜔 = ?̇?𝑥×𝐵𝑥𝜔 = 10×81 = 810 
 ?̇?𝑦𝜔 = ?̇?𝑦×𝐵𝑦𝜔 = 6×270 = 1620 
 ?̇?𝑧𝜔 = ?̇?𝑧×𝐵𝑧𝜔 = 4×2 = 6 
 ?̇?𝑡𝜔 = ?̇?𝑡×𝐵𝑡𝜔 = 4×9 = 36 
?̇?𝑦𝜔 > ?̇?𝑥𝜔 > ?̇?𝑡𝜔  >  ?̇?𝑧𝜔   𝑦, 𝑥, 𝑡, 𝑧⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗  ⃗ in 𝑅2
𝑁   (𝑆1) = (𝑆2). Q.E.D. 
 
3 DBV AND CLONING MANIPULATION 
 
According to Islam, Mohajan & Moolio (2012), in Borda count a defeated candidate can 
manipulate the election result in his favour in sincere way by introducing a candidate which is 
a clone of him and voters ranked this clone candidate immediately below him. In this situation 
Borda rule is strictly follows but manipulation is possible. Giving to them, the possibility of 
manipulation of the result of an election through the misrepresentation of preferences was 
considered neither by Borda nor by Condorcet. What about Dynamic Borda Voting? 
 
3.1.1 The problem 
 
Let us assume that there are 17 voters of three types and three alternatives x, y, z and the 
preference profile be as follows (Islam, Mohajan, & Moolio, 2012):  
Type 1: xPyPz by 8 voters, 
Type 2: yPzPx by 5 voters, 
Type 3: zPxPy by 4 voters. 
 
Borda count in this profile be as follows: 
 
 
Islam Mohajan & Moolio (2012) modify the above example by adding two alternatives 
u and v. Making preference profile being as follows: 
 
Type 1: xPyPzPuPv by 8 voters, 
𝑖1
3 𝐵𝑥𝜔𝑥
𝑖2
𝐵𝑥𝜔𝑥
2 𝐵𝑧𝜔𝑧 𝐵𝑡𝜔𝑡
𝑖3
𝐵𝑦𝜔𝑦
𝑖4
𝐵𝑦𝜔𝑦
𝐵𝑥𝜔𝑥 𝐵𝑥𝜔𝑥
1 𝐵𝑡𝜔𝑡 𝐵𝑧𝜔𝑧
0 𝐵𝑦𝜔𝑦 𝐵𝑦𝜔𝑦
𝐵𝑡𝜔𝑡 𝐵𝑧𝜔𝑧
𝐵𝑧𝜔𝑧 𝐵𝑡𝜔𝑡
 
For x: 𝐵𝑥 = 8×2 + 5×0 + 4×1 =  20 marks, 
For y: 𝐵𝑦 = 8×1 + 5×2 + 4×0 =  18 marks, 
For z: 𝐵𝑧 = 8×0 + 5×1 + 4×2 =  13 marks. 
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Type 2: yPzPxPuPv by 5 voters, 
Type 3: zPxPyPuPv by 4 voters. 
Now Borda counts in 𝑅1
𝑁  would be as 
follows: 
 
 
 
Here, x wins again. Type-3 voters have realized that x would win in the election then 
they would have change their preference profile as: Type 3: zPyPuPvPx by 4 voters, so that the 
Borda counts in 𝑅2
𝑁 would be: 
For x: ?̇?𝑥 = 8×4 + 5×2 + 4×0 = 42 marks, 
For y: ?̇?𝑦 = 8×3 + 5×4 + 4×3 =  56 marks, 
For z: ?̇?𝑧 = 8×2 + 5×3 + 4×4 =  47 marks, 
For u: ?̇?𝑢 = 8×1 + 5×1 + 4×2 =  21 marks, 
For v: ?̇?𝑣 = 8×0 + 5×0 + 4×1 =  4 marks. 
 
In this case y would have won: 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑥, 𝑢, 𝑣⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   ≠ 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑢, 𝑣⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗     (𝑆2) ≠ (𝑆1). 
 
3.1.2 Solution 
 
Let’s use DBV. 
❖ First, let’s find the 𝐵𝑁𝜔: 𝐵𝑥𝜔 , 𝐵𝑦𝜔 , 𝐵𝑧𝜔 , 𝐵𝑢𝜔  & 𝐵𝑣𝜔 
We use (𝑆1): 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑢, 𝑣⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗   to determine the entering order in the floors. Here, n=5. 
• 𝐵𝑥5 = 𝐵𝑥𝜔 = 𝐵𝑥0×(𝑛 − 1)
5−1 = 54×(5 − 1)4 = 13824 
• 𝐵𝑦4 = 𝐵𝑦𝜔 = 𝐵𝑦0×(𝑛 − 1)
4−1 = 52×(5 − 1)3 = 3328 
• 𝐵𝑧3 = 𝐵𝑧𝜔 = 𝐵𝑧0×(𝑛 − 1)
3−1 = 47×(5 − 1)2 = 752 
• 𝐵𝑢2 = 𝐵𝑢𝜔 = 𝐵𝑢0×(𝑛 − 1)
2−1 = 17×(5 − 1)1 = 68 
• 𝐵𝑣1 = 𝐵𝑣𝜔 = 𝐵𝑣×(𝑛 − 1)
1−1 = 0×(5 − 1)0 = 0 
 
❖ Now let’s derived the ?̇?𝑁𝜔: ?̇?𝑥𝜔 , ?̇?𝑦𝜔 , ?̇?𝑧𝜔 , ?̇?𝑢𝜔  & ?̇?𝑣𝜔 
There are as: ?̇?𝑁𝜔 = ?̇?𝑁×𝐵𝑁𝜔 
We already have the ?̇?𝑁. They are Borda points of different alternatives in 𝑅2
𝑁 
 ?̇?𝑥𝜔 = ?̇?𝑥×𝐵𝑥𝜔 = 42×13824 = 580608 
 ?̇?𝑦𝜔 = ?̇?𝑦×𝐵𝑦𝜔 = 56×3328 = 186368 
 ?̇?𝑧𝜔 = ?̇?𝑧×𝐵𝑧𝜔 = 47×752 = 35344 
For x: 𝐵𝑥 = 8×4 + 5×2 + 4×3 =  54 marks, 
For y: 𝐵𝑦 = 8×3 + 5×4 + 4×2 =  52 marks, 
For z: 𝐵𝑧 = 8×2 + 5×3 + 4×4 =  47 marks, 
For u: 𝐵𝒖 = 8×1 + 5×1 + 4×1 =  17 marks, 
For v: 𝐵𝒗 = 8×0 + 5×0 + 4×0 =  0 mark. 
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 ?̇?𝑢𝜔 = ?̇?𝑢×𝐵𝑢𝜔 = 21×68 = 1428 
 ?̇?𝑣𝜔 = ?̇?𝑣×𝐵𝑣𝜔 = 4×0 = 0 
 
?̇?𝑥𝜔 > ?̇?𝑦𝜔 > ?̇?𝑧𝜔  >  ?̇?𝑢𝜔 > ?̇?𝑣𝜔   𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧, 𝑢, 𝑣⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗ ⃗⃗    in 𝑅2
𝑁   (𝑆1) = (𝑆2). Q.E.D. 
 
4 DBV AND EXOGENOUS SHOCK 
 
The gap between 𝐵𝑁𝜔  𝑎𝑛𝑑 ?̇?𝑁𝜔  can pave the way to a new analysis of behavioural 
adjustment due to exogenous shocks. The aim here is to analyse the importance of the gap 
between these two vectors. The higher the distance, the greater the impact. 
Let consider the first example. The two vectors are:  
 𝐵𝑁𝜔 = (𝐵𝑥𝜔 = 81,  𝐵𝑦𝜔 = 270,   𝐵𝑧𝜔 = 2 ,   𝐵𝑡𝜔 = 9)  → 𝐵_1 = (
270
81
9
2
) 
?̇?𝑁𝜔 = (?̇?𝑥𝜔 = 810, ?̇?𝑦𝜔 = 1620, ?̇?𝑧𝜔 = 6,    ?̇?𝑡𝜔 = 36) → 𝐵_2 = (
1620
810
36
6
) 
 
 
This radar graph shows the gap 
between 𝑅1
𝑁  (in blue) and 𝑅2
𝑁  (in 
brown). The graph shows alternatives 
y (which is represented by the red 
number 1) and x (which is represented 
by the red number 2) are most 
influenced by the shock. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To capture the behaviours of individuals, let’s study elasticity.  
0
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
Alternatives's Shock gap
LnB_1 LnB_2
Figure 1: Alternatives's Shock gap. Source: Author 
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The following regression2 shows that when there is no change in the profile preference 
of individuals, the slope tends to 1. The effect here is therefore 1-1 = 0%. 
 
 
Figure 2: Level of slope when there is no change in alternative preferences. Source: Author from Stata. 
 From the graph bellow, the effect from introducing change in alternatives, 
leads to a slope of 0.6869. Meaning that the impact is 1 - 0.6869 = 0.3131. The impact of the 
change in (𝑆1), due to the change in 𝑅2
𝑁 has a magnitude of 31 on a scale of 100. 
 
 
Figure 3: Level of slope when there is a change in alternative preferences. Source: Author from Stata. 
 
The shock had therefore a 31% impact on the aggregated behaviour of individuals.  
Let us assume that we are in a stock market, the individual preferences are ordered 
according to their risk aversion (𝑅1
𝑁). They therefore choose the composition of their portfolio 
according to their risk aversion. After an exogenous short-term shock (drastic decline in oil 
prices, bad economic conditions, etc.) Individuals decide to change (𝑅2
𝑁) the composition of 
their portfolios (increase their investments in some assets and reduce in others). 
The shock leading to (𝑅2
𝑁) has therefore an impact on individuals' risk aversion. The 
magnitude of that shock is 31 over the scale we’ve defined. This can be the market volatility or 
                                                     
2 These statistical regressions are only illustrative. 
                                                                              
       LnB_1            1          .        .       .            .           .
                                                                              
       LnB_1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    10.5550426     4  2.63876066           Root MSE      =       0
                                                       Adj R-squared =  1.0000
    Residual             0     3           0           R-squared     =  1.0000
       Model    10.5550426     1  10.5550426           Prob > F      =       .
                                                       F(  1,     3) =       .
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =       4
. regress LnB_1 LnB_1, noconstant
                                                                              
       LnB_2     .6869397   .0514257    13.36   0.001     .5232801    .8505994
                                                                              
       LnB_1        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    10.5550426     4  2.63876066           Root MSE      =   .2412
                                                       Adj R-squared =  0.9780
    Residual    .174527526     3  .058175842           R-squared     =  0.9835
       Model    10.3805151     1  10.3805151           Prob > F      =  0.0009
                                                       F(  1,     3) =  178.43
      Source         SS       df       MS              Number of obs =       4
. regress LnB_1 LnB_2, noconstant
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the market oversight. It has in this case, increased their aversion if y and x are risky assets 
(according to figure 1).  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Finally, collective rationality in the aggregation of choices is sometimes difficult to 
establish. Arrow (1963) said that there was no voting rule that is not subject to bias. Thus, the 
impossibility theorem sets 4 conditions to be satisfied for any rational voting rule. The Borda 
rule respected 3 of them, but stumbled on the last one: Indifference of Irrelevant Alternatives. 
By redesigning the Borda rule's weight determination technique and making it dynamic, 
this paper allows the rule to respect the Arrow IIA. The new rule is called Dynamic Borda 
Voting (DBV). The DBV also makes it possible to deal with the problem of cloning 
manipulation.  
Calculations, propositions with proof and explanations are made to show the effectiveness 
of this method. From DBV, the paper presents a method to measure and quantify the magnitude 
of the shock due to change in irrelevant alternatives over a scale moving from 0 to 100. 
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